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As Interactive Cable Enters, Does Privacy




The growth of interactive cable television will provide Amer-
icans with the ability to transact more of their business from
their homes than ever before. The small plastic keyboard
wired to a central computer will enable the user to view cable
television programs, take college courses, participate in com-
munity action meetings and respond to opinion polls, talk
shows and debates.1 In addition, subscribers will be able to
purchase products seen on television by ordering them
through their interactive cable system and charging them to
their banking or credit accounts. In the future, the system mayinteract with department stores, service operations, banks, po-
lice and fire departments, schools, civic centers and other ele-
ments within society. However, these benefits are not without
potential disadvantages.
Interactive cable companies will maintain records of transac-
tions between the companies and subscribers. Therefore, it is
probable that a composite file will exist for each subscriber.
Charles Ferris, ex-Chairman of the Federal Communications
Commission expressed his privacy concerns toward interac-
tive cable.
[A] computer will have a record of what they [the consumers]
buy and how much they spend. It will know whether they pay
bills quickly, slowly, or not at all, and it will know where their
money comes from. It will know whether they watched the de-
bates, or the football game, or a controversial movie. It will
know when they came home the previous night-and probably
in what condition, depending on how many alarms they acci-
dentally set off. It will know how many people are in their
* Member, Third Year Class; AB., Occidental College, 1978.
1. Burnham, The Twists in Two-Way Cable, CHANNELS, June-July 1981, at 38-43.
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houses and in what rooms. In other words, it will know more
about them than anyone should.2
This capability raises a legal issue yet to be considered by
the courts: the violation of individual rights to privacy when
interactive cable records are searched by the government.
While the maintenance of data by interactive cable companies
poses a threat to personal privacy and may subject unknowing
users to unwanted intrusions into their homes, these intru-
sions may be protected by the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and the First Amendment of the
California Constitution. This protection is uncertain, however,
because different courts apply different standards in evaluat-
ing the legitimacy of citizens' privacy expectations.
The degree of expectation may be forecast by analogizing to
existing privacy protection in other areas. The records main-
tained by banks are similar to the financial data which may be
stored by interactive cable companies, and numbers recorded
by telephone company pen registers3 are similar to names
which may be kept by interactive cable systems. Inconsisten-
cies in state and federal law in these areas demonstrate the
difficulty in predicting the standard to be applied. For exam-
ple, under federal law, bank customers have no expectation of
privacy in banking records, and the government need not ob-
tain a warrant to search them.4 Further, the bank may consent
to government searches of its customers' records. By contrast,
California law holds that banking records are personal and
may not be examined by law enforcement agencies without a
warrant.
The United States Supreme Court, interpreting federal law,
permits the government to order the telephone company to
place a pen register' on a customer's phone lines and to com-
pile a list of all telephone numbers dialed without obtaining a
warrant. California law yields the opposite result.7 The state
and local governments may not order placement of pen regis-
ters without either a warrant or the consent of the customer.
2. Id. at 43.
3. A pen register is an instrument placed on a telephone line which records all
telephone numbers dialed from that phone. Without this device, local numbers go
unrecorded.
4. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
5. See note 3, supra.
6. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
7. People v. McKunes, 51 Cal. App. 3d 487 (1975).
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Federal law grants no expectation of privacy to the consumer
for bank records and telephone numbers, based on the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the United States Constitu-
tion. The California Supreme Court extends an expectation of
privacy based on their interpretation of the California Consti-
tution and independent state grounds. If these cases are used
to determine the expectation of privacy to be applied in cases
involving interactive cable'records, federal law' will not require
warrants to review customer records, and California law will
require search warrants.
Section II below summarizes current Federal and California
privacy law regarding the reasonable expectations of privacy,
protection of bank records from government searches and the
use of pen registers to record phone numbers dialed by an indi-
vidual. Section III suggests how current law may be applied to
interactive cable. Section IV offers recommendations for safe-
guarding the privacy of interactive cable users.
II
Modern Privacy Law Against Searches 8
A. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
At the heart of modern privacy law is the concept of a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy. The concept was first recog-
nized in English law in the mid-eighteenth century with the
notion that man has the right to be free from interference from
the government and government efforts to gather criminal evi-
dence.9 The right to privacy theory was developed to combat
physical governmental intrusions. New technology made
physical intrusions unnecessary and enabled the government
to bend the rules. Use of electronic devices allowed the gov-
ernment to secure evidence while working within the frame-
work of privacy law, for example.
The landmark decision of Katz v. United States lO marked the
shift of privacy law from the physical trespass standard. In
Katz, a "bug" placed on the outside of a telephone booth taped
8. This note will discuss the criminal law interpretation of privacy. The author
recognizes that civil law privacy is also an issue in interactive cable and recognizes the
possibility of civil damages for an invasion of this privacy. Civil law privacy is beyond
the scope of this note, however.
9. Entick v. Carrington, 6 Geo. III, 19 Howell's State Trials 1030 (1765).
10. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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Katz's conversations without a physical intrusion. The United
States Supreme Court held the search unreasonable and thus
violative of the Fourth Amendment because there was a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy. The Fourth Amendment pro-
tects people not places. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion,
which has since become the standard, suggested this guideline:
1. Did the person exhibit an actual expectation of privacy?
2. Was the expectation one that society is prepared to rec-
ognize as reasonable?"
Further, the Court stated, "what he seeks to preserve as pri-
vate, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitu-
tionally protected."'1 2 The Court insisted on the search warrant
requirement stating "[s] earches conducted outside the judicial
process, without prior approval by a judge or magistrate, are
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated ex-
ceptions.' 3 The rationale for this requirement was the elimi-
nation of after-the-fact justification for the search.' 4
Without defining terms, the Court advocated the analysis of
justification incorporating social considerations and
reasonableness. 5
B. Protection of Bank Records
The expectation of privacy test has been applied by the
courts in determining the protection to be afforded to cus-
tomer's bank records. The rules regarding the right to privacy
established in Katz and its progeny 6 eroded the long standing
rule from Boyd v. United States'7 that it was inherently unrea-
11. Id. at 361.
12. Id. at 351.
13. Id. at 357. Unless the delay in procuring a search warrant would endanger lives
(Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967)) or result in the destruction of evidence (Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963)), there must be a search warrant granted under the de-
tached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate.
14. 389 U.S. at 358; Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964).
15. Note, From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth
Amendment Protection, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 968, 983 (1968), analyzes the import of Katz
and provides demonstrations of its application. For an example, a narcotics transac-
tion in a highly secluded area in New York's Central Park may have a high degree of
freedom from intrusion, but the expectation of privacy and the social acceptance of
such an expectation do not warrant protection of the activity.
16. For an analysis of the demise of Boyd, a case prior to Katz, see Note, The Life
and Times of Boyd v. U.S. (1886-1976), 76 MIcH. L REV. 184 (1977).
17. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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sonable for the government to seize documents from a third
party, such as a bank, solely because documents were poten-
tially valuable as evidence against the owner. The change
culminated in the decision of United States v. Miller.18
In Miller, the government obtained personal banking records
as evidence of the overt act necessary to convict the defend-
ants of conspiracy to defraud the United States of tax revenues
by manufacturing and selling distilled spirits.19 The Court of
Appeals held that the government must follow legal process2 °
before requesting to inspect bank records.2 ' Cooperation from
the bank did not equal consent of the individual to this inspec-
tion.22 The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision
and held there was no legitimate expectation of privacy in the
contents of the original checks and deposit slips since the
checks were not confidential communications but were negoti-
able instruments to be used in commercial transactions.2 3
Miller had no knowledge of the bank's delivery of the docu-
ments pursuant to the subpoena and had voluntarily conveyed
all the documents to the bank. The materials were held to be
business records of the bank, not Miller's private papers.24
Furthermore, the Court narrowed the Katz holding by stating
"the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of in-
formation revealed to a third party [the bank] .... ,,25 This is
true even if the information is revealed to the bank on the as-
sumption it will be used for a limited! purpose and the confi-
dence will not be betrayed. Thus, the Court concluded that the
expectation of privacy is unjustifiable where a third party is
involved regardless of the relationship between the bank, the
18. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
19. Id. at 437-438.
20. 500 F.2d 751, 757 (5th Cir. 1974) (quoting Cal. Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S.
21, 52 (1974)).
21. Id. at 758.
22. Miller had no knowledge of the subpoena duces tecum obtained by the govern-
ment to secure the documents. This was not relevant to the decision rendered by the
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. The bank's absence of notifica-
tion to the depositor is a "neglect without legal consequences here, however unattrac-
tive it may be." Miller at 443 n.5. Kelley v. United States, 536 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1976)
reenforced Miller. Governmental compulsion of the bank producing records was not
against the individual but against the bank. There is no notice requirement.
23. 425 U.S. at 442.
24. Id. at 440.
25. Id. at 443.
No. 41
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customer and the government.
California courts have upheld depositors' privacy expecta-
tions in their bank records, relying upon the California Consti-
tution and independent state grounds in Burrows v. Superior
Court.27 In Burrows, the court set forth stricter requirements
for government access. The legality of the search must be
based on either the consent of the depositor or the involve-
ment of the legal process in a search warrant.28
In Burrows, the court said, "[a] bank customer's reasonable
expectation is that, absent compulsion by the legal process, the
matters he reveals to the bank will be utilized by the bank only
for internal banking purposes. '29 Because of this expectation
of privacy, the court mandated that the government obtain a
search warrant to review customers' bank records.
The court added consideration of the importance of the activ-
ity in contemporary society to the test of reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy. "For all practical purposes, the disclosure by
individuals or business firms of their financial affairs to a bank
is not entirely volitional, since it is impossible to participate in
the economic life of contemporary society without maintaining
a bank account.' ' 30 Bank customers supply this information to
aid the bank in their business relationship, but base the usage
on their expectation of privacy.31
The requirements of consent to the involvement of the legal
process were further developed in Valley Bank of Nevada v.
26. Even if the banks acted as government agents in maintaining and supplying
the information, this is not an intrusion upon depositors' Fourth Amendment rights.
Miller has been highly criticized by criminal law scholars. See W. LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE, A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 411 (1978), in which the author
says "The result reached in Miller is dead wrong, and the Court's woefully inadequate
reasoning does great violence to the theory of Fourth Amendment protection which
the Court had developed in Katz."
27. 13 Cal. 3d 238 (1974).
28. Id. at 245. The changes in the aftermath of Proposition 8 remain unknown. The
Supreme Court will determine the legality of facets of changes in the exclusionary rule
and search and seizure law when cases arise. These changes do not change analysis of
the law or application to interactive cable.
29. Id. at 243.
30. Id. at 247.
31. California has codified the confidentiality of bank records and provided stan-
dards for government access in Cal. Gov't Code §§ 7460-7490 (West 1980). These sec-
tions provide that without either customer authorized disclosure or compliance with
the search warrant particularity, state and local governments and agencies may not
request originals or copies of information relating to financial institutions' customers
from those institutions.
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Superior Court.2 There, the California Supreme Court held
that while information disclosed to a bank in confidence may
be discoverable, the bank must first make reasonable efforts to
locate the customer and notify him of the discovery proceeding
and provide him with a reasonable opportunity to object and
seek protective court orders.3 In citing Burrows, the court re-
fined the definition of a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Based upon the reasonable expectation that the record will be
utilized only for internal banking purposes, the court found
there was an implied agreement of non-disclosure.34 That im-
plied agreement justified the expectation of privacy in bank
records.
Thus, federal and California courts, interpreting different
constitutions, have supplied different meanings of "reasonable
expectation of privacy" concerning search and seizure of bank
records. The United States Supreme Court, interpreting the
United States Constitution, holds that by relinquishing the
records to the bank, the depositor simultaneously releases all
expectations of privacy in either the original documents or
photocopies thereof. The California Supreme Court, interpret-
ing the California Constitution, upholds the concept that the
customer in relinquishing these materials to the bank is antici-
pating the bank will use the information for internal purposes
only. The United States Supreme Court holds that bank
records are business records, and therefore are outside the
scope of personal protection where a subpoena duces tecum is
issued to obtain the information. The California Supreme
Court finds that because banking is such an integral element in
the daily life of an individual, use of a bank does not constitute
consent to a search, and privacy is necessary.
C. Protections Against Pen Registers
Pen registers are a relatively new concept in the question of
the right to privacy and freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures. The United States Supreme Court has held that
pen registers are not to be measured under the protections ac-
32. 15 Cal. 3d 652 (1975). Valley Bank is based on civil discovery. The standard for
criminal discovery is higher yet.
33. Id. at 658.
34. This rule is generally applied in other jurisdictions. First National Bank in
Lenox v. Brown, 181 N.W.2d 178, 183 (Iowa 1970); Milohnich v. First National Bank of
Miami Springs, 224 So. 2d 759, 761 (Fla. App. 1969).
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corded to interceptions of telephone conversations. 5 In Smith
v. Maryland,36 the Supreme Court ruled that use of a pen reg-
ister is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment and therefore may be conducted without a search
warrant.37
The United States Supreme Court applied the theory of the
reasonable expectation of privacy and held that the suspect
did not have the necessary expectation of privacy in the phone
numbers dialed to demand protection from the recording of
those numbers.3 8 The Court analyzed the pen register in light
of the two-pronged test of Katz and found:
1. The suspect entertained no actual expectation as to the
numbers he dialed because telephone subscribers know that in
the act of dialing they must convey numerical information to
the phone company. He could, however, expect to keep the
contents of his conversation private.39
2. Even if Smith entertained an expectation of privacy
about the numbers he dialed, this expectation is not one soci-
ety is prepared to recognize as reasonable.4 ° By voluntarily di-
aling, he assumed the risk the company might reveal the
information to the police although the company does not nor-
mally record the numbers dialed on local calls.4 '
Justice Blackmun, writing for the plurality, also stated, "This
Court consistently has held that a person has no legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to
third parties."42
35. United States v. New York Telephone Company, 434 U.S. 159 (1977). The stan-
dard to be applied to the interception of wire communication is governed by the Omni-
bus Crime Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976). Pen registers do not intercept
communications.
36. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
37. 442 U.S. at 742.
38. Id. at 743.
39. Id. at 741-743.
40. Id. at 743-744.
41. Id. at 744-745. Nonetheless, 90 years of case law contradicts Justice Blackmun.
See 389 U.S. at 349.
42. Yale Kamisar, a constitutional law scholar, commented on Smith: "It is begin-
ning to look as if the only way someone living in our society can avoid 'assuming the
risk' that various intermediary institutions will reveal information to the police is by
engaging in drastic discipline ... characteristic of life under totalitarian regimes." He
cites that the alternatives available are foregoing the use of the phone or having the
police record all the numbers he dials, foregoing the postal service or having the police
collect the names and addresses of all his correspondents and foregoing the use of
banks or providing police with access to an enormous quantity of highly personal data.
We are talking about unrestrained access to data. "The sky is the limit, aside from
[Vol. 4
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Interpreting California law, the California Court of Appeal
has ruled that a customer has the same expectation of privacy
for telephone numbers dialed as he does for banking records.43
The customer has the same expectation that his records will
only be used to compute the bill as the bank customer has to
believe that records will only be used in the course of business.
The California Court of Appeal rejected the argument that the
records of the phone calls belonged to the phone company,
stating that it is not the telephone that has an expectation of
privacy and that the telephone company's rights are not at is-
sue." The telephone company is a neutral party without sig-
nificant interest and cannot consent to the search of their
customers' records on behalf of the customer without his
consent.45
The California court also applied the Burrows analysis in
stressing the importance of the telephone in daily life. "It is
equally true that, in this age and place, it is virtually impossi-
ble for an individual or a business entity to function in the eco-
nomic sphere without a telephone and that a record of
telephone calls also may provide a virtual biography. '46
In contrast with federal law, the California view of search
and seizure is that individuals are entitled to reasonably high
standards of protection from intrusion. California attaches a
liberal interpretation to the word reasonable, weighing the
place of the activity in daily life against the expectation of pri-
vacy. Further, California denies that consent by a third party
to examine records may substantiate the legality of the search.
A neutral third party cannot assert its consent where its func-
tion does not coincide with a significant interest. The language
in Burrows and McKunes underscores this theme by holding
the right to consent belongs to the customer in each instance.
whatever 'self-discipline' the police or other agency may choose to exercise." J.
CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L TRIBE, THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS
1978-1979 143-145 (1979).
43. People v. McKunes, 51 Cal. App. 3d 487 (1975).
44. Id. at 492.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. California elevated the right to privacy to a constitutional protection and an
inalienable right in 1974. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1 states:
"All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights.
Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possess-




The federal standard developed in recent court holdings
demonstrates a markedly lower level of protection from search
and seizure by law enforcement agencies. Concerning banking
and phone numbers, the United States Supreme Court holds
that because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in
banking and phone numbers, gathering information from those
sources does not constitute a search in the context of the
Fourth Amendment. Recent decisions have therefore eroded
the chances for future findings of other reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy under federal law if the same reasoning is ap-
plied hereafter.
III
Application of Existing Law to Interactive Cable
Systems
A. Overview
The Supreme Courts of the United States and of California
have had no opportunity to answer the question of what pri-
vacy protections will be given to subscribers of interactive
cable. At the moment, the use of two-way cable is limited, and
its capabilities are prospective. However, this should not affect
the analysis to be applied by the courts when faced with the
issue. This section will analyze what restraints courts may ap-
ply to government searches of the data bases of two-way cable
systems.
Interactive cable has such diverse capabilities that state and
federal courts could conceivably choose to analyze interactive
systems by components and apply existing law to aspects of
interactive cable which are similar to past fact situations. For
example, the electronic transfer of funds by the interactive net-
work can be analyzed under the existing law of privacy in
banking records. This approach provides only a partial solu-
tion because in reviewing the funds transfer records main-
tained by an interactive cable system, the government may
have access to significantly more records than those from
which evidence is sought.4 8 Therefore, it is critical that the is-
48. While portions of the interactive cable file may be severable from other parts,
the risk that evidence obtained in one part of the file will suggest cause to believe that
there is further evidence in the remainder of the file demands that the subscribers'
records be analyzed as if they were one indivisible entry.
Applying a different standard of privacy for interactive cable produces inconsistent
[Vol. 4
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sue of privacy expectations and the legality of searches of two-
way interactive data bases be considered by the courts with
respect to all the information in the data bank.
Interactive cable records will include information from all or
some of the possible cable applications. These may be gath-
ered from security systems (including when the parties leave
the house), smoke detectors (including where flammables are
stored), classes taken (including whether or not the student
attended), polls (including responses to community, political
and general information), funds transferred (including from
what account and to which party) and lists of products and
services purchased and from which sources. The courts will
have to address the issue of whether the government should
have unrestricted access and what the Constitutional safe-
guards should be.
If all the records maintained by the interactive cable com-
pany are treated with the expectation of privacy used by the
United States Supreme Court in Miller and are viewed as doc-
uments within a business transaction voluntarily exposed to a
third party, there will be no federal expectation of privacy, and
a search could be conducted without a search warrant and
without the benefit of an impartial magistrate's review. If this
approach were taken, it is likely that law enforcement agencies
would be able to review the files upon mere issuance of a
subpoena.
A significant portion of the records that will be maintained
by the cable company are similar to those maintained by the
bank in Miller. The cable electronic funds transfer and depart-
ment store credit accounts are tantamount to bank records.
The standard for credit cards should follow the reasoning in
Miller. The language there clearly suggests that under federal
law, credit transactions would not be protected. "[T] he Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information re-
vealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government
authorities .... ,"9 Credit card transactions involve yet an-
other party, the merchant. This further supports the lack of
protection and lack of expectation of privacy.
levels of privacy between banking through cable and banking through conventional
means. The Court would either need to alter the conventional policy of banking pri-
vacy or distinguish the expectation of privacy, and hence privacy accorded, between
the two alternative banking methods.
49. 425 U.S. at 443.
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Under California law, a different conclusion would follow.
California applies and interprets its own constitution and
therefore is able to recognize the right to privacy to a greater
extent than the federal courts do when interpreting federal
law. In 1974, California elevated the right to privacy to a consti-
tutionally protected inalienable right.5 0 This judicial ideology
would likely result in protection of interactive cable subscrib-
ers from warrantless searches and seizures. California's pro-
tection of bank customers from law enforcement searches of
banking transactions without a warrant and telephone sub-
scribers from telephone company use of pen registers suggests
the likelihood that California would protect the privacy of in-
teractive cable subscribers.
B. Consent
A subscriber's consent would arguably negate a claim of a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the interactive cable data
base. Consent to a search of interactive data records might be
implied by the subscriber's voluntary participation in the inter-
active cable service." There is, however, strong legal basis for
rejecting an implied consent or waiver of privacy under these
circumstances. Under federal law, Miller and Smith consid-
ered relinquishment of information to a third party sufficient to
find consent. On this ground, there was no protection ac-
corded. Under California law, the argument that consent viti-
ates expectations of privacy has been rejected in Burrows and
McKunes. California recognized the importance of banking
telephone information and held it negates consent as being
tantamount to adhesion.
Interactive cable does not yet have the equivalent value to be
considered critical to functioning in modern times. Within the
next decade or two, it is probable that interactive cable will be
an integral mode of multi-faceted communication. Thus, given
the potential and versatility of cable systems, protections akin
to those in banking and telephony should be established early
to safeguard against unconsented intrusions into privacy.
In both federal and California courts, consent may be ana-
lyzed by contract tenets. If as a precursor to purchasing inter-
active cable service a customer must consent to relinquishing
50. See note 47, supra.
51. See Miller and Smith discussions, sections I-B and I-C, supra.
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rights to informational privacy, the contract could be adhe-
sive. 2 The subscriber's option would be consent or refusal of
the service. This option is ostensibly non-existent because the
bargaining positions are so unequal. Under contract analysis,
this could be considered an adhesion contract because the su-
perior bargaining position of the interactive cable company
renders contract formation unconscionable. The subscriber is
given the option: forego privacy or forego interactive cable.
IV
Alternatives
The courts may not presently be prepared to establish a co-
herent standard for adjudicating the interactive cable system
privacy issue. The use of inconsistent standards could subject
subscribers to unanticipated intrusions. There are several al-
ternatives to judicial action. Legislatures could regulate the
standard at either the federal or state level, federal agencies
could establish provisions for dispersal of information or inter-
active cable companies could place a section within the
franchising agreement regarding the right to privacy.
A. Federal Legislation
Passage of federal legislation codifying the constraints to be
placed on law and government officials in securing customer
records from cable companies may be the best way to establish
a clear, consistent standard for all governmental agencies.
Within the legislation, Congress could provide rules not only
for governmental entities in law enforcement, but could erect a
guideline for courts to follow.
In enacting such laws, Congress could apply either the
Miller/Smith rationale in providing a reduced level of privacy,
or follow the Burrows/McKunes California law in granting
greater rights to privacy. California's approach is preferred be-
cause interactive cable may be so intertwined with every fact
of daily life as to form a composite of each of the subscribers.
Therefore, the national extension of greater rights to privacy
may be necessary to prevent obtrusive governmental conduct.
However, whether the federal or California standard is applied,
federal legislation would enable customers and companies to
52. CALAMARI & PERILLO, CONTRACTs 336-343 (2nd ed. 1977).
No. 41
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realize, in contemplation of cable contracts, what express
rights could be anticipated.
The likelihood of passage of federal legislation appears re-
mote in this era of deregulation. Since the late 1970's, for ex-
ample, the oil, airline and radio-television industries have been
deregulated. This trend makes it more probable that the issue
of privacy, if legislated, will be governed by the states.
B. State Legislation
State legislation governing the right to privacy in interactive
cable would have some of the same benefits as federal legisla-
tion. Such laws would codify the question of when law en-
forcement/government agencies could search interactive cable
records. However, in states such as California, which have
constitutionalized the right to privacy, the legislation would
necessarily fall within the state constitutional protections.
The weakness of legislation at the state level is in the poten-
tial inconsistency of laws among states. Interactive cable will
involve banking, shopping, other activities between states and
the maintenance of information in states different from the
subscribers' residences. Because of this, there is a significant
possibility of conflicting laws in different states. Differences
between the states would present an undue burden on cable
companies. While laws would exist as guidelines, there is a
question whether the law in the transmitting state, the sub-
scriber's state or the law in the state in which the information
was stored would be the applicable law. For these reasons,
state legislation is a less effective method of establishing a con-
crete set of rules for privacy in interactive cable.
C. Franchising Contracts
Some cities with interactive cable systems have required the
companies involved to use franchise agreements which extend
privacy protections beyond both federal and California case
holdings. In Nashville, Tennessee, Citizens for Privacy in
Cable TV mounted a campaign to inform citizens of the bene-
fits and burdens of two-way cable. The report stated that the
potential abuses must be "acknowledged and honestly dealt
53. For resolution of this conflict of laws question, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Of
CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 152 (1971).
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with."5 The Nashville citizens believed that more was needed
than just cable company warnings to subscribers that their in-
teractions could become a matter of public record. To protect
subscribers, the organization wrote proposals to be incorpo-
rated into the ordinance for franchising.55
The organization reasoned that use of a franchise agreement
could produce a clear and highly protective privacy standard.
The agreement extends privacy coverage beyond both the
state and federal levels. It forbids the cable television com-
pany from giving information to any third party without the ex-
press written consent of the subscriber. The contract is
designed to protect the subscriber from intrusions such as
those in Miller, which held there was no right to privacy.
There are several apparent shortcomings in the contractual
approach to privacy law. Foremost, the franchising agreement
does not have a proviso which specifies the standard for law
enforcement. The unqualified prohibition against giving infor-
mation to a third party without consent would undoubtedly not
include police and government. Therefore, the court would
still have to establish the law, deciding whether a subpoena
duces tecum or search warrant would be required. 6
Thus, while the franchising agreement superficially appears
to grant the most privacy protection, it leaves critical questions
unanswered. So far, the courts have not confronted privacy is-
sues arising from the Nashville franchising agreement. In the
future, such a ruling could be useful to other states in assess-
ing the value of application of a franchising agreement for the
protection of subscribers.
54. Electronic Nightmare, supra note 3, at 31.
55. The proposals were as follows:
a. The Cable Television Company is forbidden to give, sell, or otherwise
transfer any information about specific subscribers or specific subscribing
households to any third party without the express, written consent of such
subscriber. Consent may not be obtained through use of the Cable Televi-
sion System.
b. The Cable Television Company may give, sell, or transfer general informa-
tion about its entire pool of subscribers or subscribing households to a
third party, provided that the information is reduced to a form that does
not enable the third party to trace the information provided to specific sub-
scribers, specific households, neighborhoods, or any geographic area more
limited than the entire subscriber pool.
Id.
56. Query whether the release of customer records pursuant to a search would




D. Courts' Reconsideration of Present Standards
With the increase in employment and capabilities of interac-
tive cable, the expectation of privacy may be reconsidered. To
date, the Supreme Court of the United States has considered
the privacy accorded to banking and pen registers indepen-
dently. In the future, these, and innumerable other detailed
records, will be maintained in a single source. The pervasive-
ness of permitting the government to examine these records
exceeds any prior notions. The data therein will not be one
facet of life; it will be a dossier. In recognition of this situation,
the Supreme Court may have to reevaluate past law. The re-
consideration, if any, will not arrive until interactive cable has
developed substantially.
California's passage of a constitutional privacy right better
prepares that state for adjudicating privacy rights when inter-
active cable capacities develop. Therefore, it is probable that




Under current law, drawing from analogy to pen registers
and bank records, the federal law would probably not accord a
right to privacy to interactive cable records based on Smith
and Miller. Consequently, government seizure of records
could be accomplished without the subscriber's consent
through the cooperation of the interactive cable company or
the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum for the records.
In California, the law recognizes the right to privacy guaran-
teed by the California Constitution and supported by case law
in Burrows and McKunes. Therefore, without a search warrant
which specified the records to be seized, the government would
not have access to interactive cable records.
The most effective manner of establishing a clear, concise
standard for interactive cable privacy would be the passage of
federal legislation. There is little possibility of such enact-
ment. The courts will be forced to grapple with the issue of
privacy in interactive cable, but must be wary of making a deci-
sion without realizing the practical and social implications.
Without recognizing the possibilities, the U.S. Supreme Court
could make available a tidy record of individual habits to gov-
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ernmental agencies without the necessity of judicial involve-
ment, leaving California law as a bastion of hope for privacy
seekers.

